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Teaching about ‘Area 51’? How to Cover Secret Government 
Technology and Capabilities in Intelligence Studies Courses 
Armin Krishnan 
 
Introduction 
While there is a wealth of excellent standard literature available specializing on intelligence 
analysis and how intelligence feeds into foreign policy, which has helped to turn intelligence 
studies from a fringe subject into a legitimate and serious academic discipline, there are still 
aspects of intelligence that are notoriously difficult to cover in public university courses, but 
which are also of enormous importance for understanding intelligence. One problem is presented 
in the discussion of covert action and its current role in U.S. foreign policy, as covert action is 
always controversial and not without good reason subjected to a lot of secrecy, which always 
invites a lot of criticism and speculation. Similar is the situation with respect to secret 
government technology and certain methods used for the collection and analysis of intelligence. 
Although there is some good knowledge in the public domain about many aspects of Technical 
Intelligence (TECHINT) from earlier decades, there is great scarcity with respect to official 
information on current capabilities for technical collection and analysis. Even excellent primers 
on U.S. intelligence such as Jeffrey Richelson’s The US Intelligence Community are very sketchy 
with respect to collection systems that are currently in use by the U.S. government.1  
 
The problem is that the U.S. Government does not – in some cases – even acknowledge the 
existence of certain collection systems and methods. Nothing epitomizes the extreme secrecy in 
the field of secret weapons and secret intelligence capabilities more than the Nevada Test Site, 
known to the public as Area-51 or Dreamland, where some revolutionary intelligence platforms 
have been developed. In almost sixty years of secret testing and operations conducted on the 
Nevada Test Site there has not been a single whistleblower revealing current activities, whose 
credentials can be verified. The super-secret Area 51 may be ironically just the tip of the iceberg 
of a whole clandestine world of secret government technology development. Several journalists, 
researchers, and scholars have pointed to existence of a ‘black world’ of secret sites, secret 
projects, secret programs, and secret technology development that has been mushrooming at a 
constant pace since the 1950s and which has come to consume at least ten percent of the U.S. 
defense budget.2 Some estimates are substantially higher.3 It is no longer possible to simply 
ignore the ‘black world’ of secret U.S. government technology development and usage without 
arriving at a very incomplete understanding of U.S. intelligence capabilities. Nevertheless, one 
has to ask the question: is it even possible to teach about Area 51 without drifting too much into 
‘X-Files’ territory?  
                                                             
1
 Richelson, Jeffrey, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011). 
2
 Paglen, Trevor, Blank Spots on the Map: The Dark Geography of the Pentagon’s Secret World (New York: New 
American Library, 2010), 182. 
3
 According to a report by the DoD Inspector General, an audit of the Pentagon’s budget for Fiscal Year 1999 
indicated that $2.3 trillion dollars in accounting items out of an overall of $6.9 trillion “were not supported by 
adequate audit trails or sufficient evidence to determine their validity.” Even if most of the $2.3 trillion can be 
written off due to waste, corruption, and poor accounting practices, one has to wonder how much of the money was 
used for funding highly classified technology development projects or ‘black’ operations. ‘Audit Report: Report 
Number D-2000-091’, U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (25 February 2000), 8.  
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It is the contention of this paper that it is indeed possible to teach about secret government 
technology in a serious manner and that a serious discussion of a phenomenon such as Area 51 is 
indeed stimulating and beneficial for students of U.S. intelligence. Since there is not much 
readily available literature on current capabilities and sometimes deliberate deception on part of 
the government, one has to be creative in terms of finding relevant information from a wide 
range of open sources and in terms of putting the material together in a way that makes sure 
some inevitable speculations have at least a firm grounding in known facts and are based on 
good analysis. It is also crucial to always communicate to students how reliable the information 
is and where it comes from. In other words, researching and teaching about secret technology 
requires a mindset and methodologies based on open source intelligence analysis.   
 
The Government Couldn’t Keep a Secret, Right? 
There is the misperception, which is continuously reinforced and perpetuated by politicians and 
the media, that nothing leaks as badly as Washington and that there are no real secrets. The 
government is believed to be generally incompetent to protect its greatest secrets and that all 
secrets eventually reach the public because of leakers, whistle-blowers, and investigative 
journalists busying themselves with undermining the very elaborate and very expensive 
machinery of government secrecy.4 This might be true in the sense that a lot of classified 
information gets eventually leaked, mostly for political purposes and often by the sitting 
administration itself, but it is definitely not true when it comes to development and operation of 
secret technical intelligence collection systems and methods. These are classified ‘above’ Top 
Secret and are subjected to only minimal Congressional oversight. People are given access to this 
information only on a need-to-know basis and only after they have been carefully vetted. They 
have to sign a non-disclosure agreement and would face up to thirty years in prison if they would 
make unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information. It is no surprise that leaks to the public 
about highly classified current technical collection systems, operations, and other sensitive 
intelligence information are extremely rare. 
 
Secret government technology development programs are typically so-called Special Access 
Programs (SAPs) that employ special security measures and have substantially reduced oversight 
mechanisms.5 The Commission on government secrecy headed by Senator Patrick Moynihan 
revealed: “Special access programs can concern research, development, and acquisition 
activities; intelligence (including covert action); or military operations.”6 The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) calls their ‘deep black’ programs Controlled Access Programs 
(CAPs). Any information related to sources and methods is classified Top Secret Sensitive 
Compartmented Information with a codename that identifies the particular compartment (TS SCI 
codename). Very few people within the U.S. Government and the military-industrial complex, 
called ‘Super-Users,’ have access to all information on a compartmentalized program. The 
government will usually not comment on SAPs, although their existence might be known to the 
                                                             
4
 The U.S. government spent $11.36 billion dollars on the proper classification, handling, and protection of 
government secrets in 2011. ‘2011 Cost Report,’ Information Security Oversight Office (20 June 2012): 2, available 
at: http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2011-cost-report.pdf. 
5
 Sweetman, Bill, Lockheed Stealth (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004), 29. 
6
 ‘Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy’ (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, 
1997), p. XXVIII. 
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public, as they are identified by their program names in official budgets. However, few specifics 
about these programs would be released other than their name and general purpose. In addition, 
there are ‘black’ programs that are not identified in official budgets and which are hidden in 
other budget items. Based on the discrepancies in the overall Department of Defense (DoD) 
budget it has been calculated that there was $56 billion dollar black budget in 2011, which 
financed highly sensitive weapons development programs, as well as intelligence programs.7  
 
These ‘black’ programs are known as Unacknowledged SAPs/CAPs, in which cases the 
government will publicly deny the existence of these programs. For this end government 
agencies and contractors are authorized to employ cover stories to hide these programs, usually 
in less classified or public programs of a different purpose. The use of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration’s (NASA) Discoverer program for concealing the real purpose of 
testing and deploying the Corona satellites comes to mind. In other cases the intelligence 
community relies largely on private corporations, on front companies, and on other cut-outs. A 
very famous example that shows the great lengths to which intelligence agencies go protecting 
special collection operations is of course Project Azorian or the salvage operation of the Soviet 
missile submarine K-129. The operation used Howard Hughes and his company as a cut-out and 
relied on a sophisticated cover story that disguised the operation as a deep sea mining effort.8  
 
Interestingly, the efforts of keeping intelligence activities secret do not stop with SAPs/CAPs: 
some programs are even more secretive. These are so-called ‘waived’ USAPs/UCAPs/SCI 
programs, which may be exempted from being even reported to Congress. For example, it is 
believed that the National Security Agency’s (NSA) domestic surveillance program codenamed 
Stellar Wind is a waived SCI program that does not appear on any public budget and may be 
only visible to the ‘Gang of Eight’. Even the ‘Gang of Eight’ might not be given many details, 
nor would this very small group of people be able to exercise effective oversight, considering 
that alone the list of programs with special access controls regularly provided to Congress is 300 
pages long. According to the Moynihan report from 1997, “[t]here are 150 DoD-approved 
SAPs…down from 200 in the late 1980s, and roughly 300 SCI compartments, compared with an 
estimated 800 in the late 1980s.” These numbers do not even include any sub-compartments, in 
which further and different programs could be hidden. No human being would have even the 
time to study all or even any of these programs in detail. According to remarks by DNI James 
Clapper, “[t]here is only one entity in the entire universe that has visibility on all SAPs – that’s 
God.”9  
 
Overall it can be said that the U.S. government is not only able to keep secrets, but has a very 
impressive track record keeping secrets. Some ‘black’ intelligence and weapons development 
programs were successfully kept from the public for decades. These very basic observations 
about the machinery and effectiveness of government secrecy is extremely important for arriving 
at a much better understanding of current U.S. intelligence capabilities and methods.  
   
                                                             
7
 Adam Rawnsley, ‘Go Inside the $56 Billion “Black” Budget’, Wired (18 February 2011), available at: 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/go-inside-the-56-billion-black-budget/. 
8
 Polmar, Norman and Michael White, Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129 (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2010). 
9
 Priest, Dana and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State (New York: 
little, Brown, and Company, 2010), 27. 
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What to Include in a Course on Technical Intelligence Collection and 
Analysis 
Technical collection and analysis disciplines have evolved over the decades and have grown in 
number. More and more ‘INTs’ have been added to the arsenal of collection methods. A course 
on technical intelligence collection should include not only the traditional disciplines of Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), but also some new and emerging 
disciplines, methods, and technologies, which shall be briefly outlined below.  
  
SIGINT 
It is the oldest and most established technical collection discipline with a history of almost 150 
years or even thousands of years if one includes Ancient methods for hiding and enciphering 
communications. SIGINT has evolved from merely tapping telegraph lines and from traditional 
code breaking to a technologically highly sophisticated effort of systematically monitoring 
communications and traffic, as well as other signals around the world, including the capability of 
precisely locating transmitters for targeting purposes and deriving other technical information on 
transmitters. The biggest problem with respect to teaching SIGINT is that there is very little good 
literature that deals with current SIGINT capabilities and methods. In particular, the available 
literature on contemporary SIGINT organizations and operations has almost nothing to say about 
current code breaking practices or methods. Information on current SIGINT collection activities 
is also very limited.  
 
IMINT 
Imagery intelligence is the other established technical collection discipline, which has a largely 
known and well-researched history. Many Cold War collection systems and operations have 
been declassified, most importantly the Corona Project and Hexagon documents. There are many 
excellent case studies on the uses of imagery during the Cold War period, such as the role of 
imagery intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis or the uses and limitations of imagery 
during the 1970s Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. Where it gets frustrating in terms of 
available literature is a lack of good literature on imagery analysis techniques for national 
security, as well as with respect to currently available collection systems such the newest 
generation of earth observation satellites and their capabilities. For example, the Undersecretary 
for Intelligence Michael Vickers has recently hinted that the new spy satellites would be “the 
most significant change to our overhead architecture in at least three decades”.10 Unfortunately 
for us there is no further official information available as to why the new capability would be so 
revolutionary. 
 
MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) 
Over the last ten years MASINT has emerged from being a minor contributor of intelligence to a 
major technical collection discipline, which already overlaps with and supplants the traditional 
SIGINT and IMINT disciplines. MASINT is difficult to teach to students in general terms 
because it consists of a large number of different types of sensors and different methods for 
                                                             
10
 David Barton, ‘Mike Vickers: U.S. Has New Spy Satellites, Biggest Advance in 30 Years,’ ExecutiveGov.com (12 
October 2012), available at: http://www.executivegov.com/2012/10/mike-vickers-u-s-has-new-spy-satellites-biggest-
advance-in-30-years/. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/21
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analyzing complex sensor data. So it is crucial to outline some of the physical principles behind 
MASINT collection systems and analysis techniques, as well as explaining MASINT’s growing 
contribution to some of the biggest current challenges for U.S. intelligence, namely counter-
proliferation (WMD detection), counterterrorism, and finding deeply buried underground 
facilities. There are also several historical examples that have a continuing relevance for the 
discipline: the Long Range Detection Program, DSP, and SOSUS.   
 
Technical OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) 
OSINT contributes most in terms of quantity to US intelligence collection. While OSINT is 
mostly about the collection and analysis of published or broadcast material, there is also a 
technical side to OSINT and this is at the current time primarily commercial imagery, navigation, 
and mapping technology, as well as new computerized methods for tracking and analysis, which 
is known as Geographic Information Systems (GIS). This subject is very important because of 
the widespread use of commercial imagery and GIS by a large number of federal agencies and 
private businesses and it is also relatively unproblematic to cover because of the massive amount 
of public literature.   
 
HACKINT (Hacker Intelligence) 
The collection of intelligence through computer network attacks has become the cutting-edge of 
SIGINT and has enabled fairly new ways of acquiring intelligence on a range of state and non-
state targets. Sometimes termed ‘cyber espionage’ or even ‘cyberwar’ government hackers have 
been highly successful in attacking foreign computer networks and in downloading sensitive 
information. It is known that Chinese hackers were able to steal a terabyte of data relating to the 
F-35 project from defense contractor Lockheed Martin. Although it is rarely officially 
acknowledged, the NSA is engaged in similar offensive cyber operations and might be actually 
ahead of the Chinese in the field of cyber espionage. Students shall understand the role of 
intelligence services in the cyber domain, as well as some of the technical and intelligence 
methods used for gaining access to sensitive data such as the use of hacker tools (viruses, worms, 
Trojans, botnets), as well as black bag jobs, ‘social engineering,’ hardware viruses and 
backdoors built into devices and electronic components, and the use of malicious insiders. The 
available literature on the general subject matter is extensive, but very little of the literature has 
anything to say about U.S. government cyber espionage and other offensive cyber operations, 
which makes it tricky to understand current U.S. capabilities and collection activities in this 
field.    
 
Secret Aerospace Technology, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and Nano-Technology (NT) 
There is a long history of secret development of revolutionary aerospace systems, most 
importantly the U-2, the SR-71, and the stealth fighter, but information about the Pentagon’s 
secret space program and a potential successor system to the SR-71 (for some time known as 
Aurora) are sketchy at best and unconfirmed. Nevertheless, it is absolutely certain that the 
Pentagon is spending substantial amounts of money in developing revolutionary aerospace 
systems, some of which are probably operational and used in crisis situations and wartime.11 
                                                             
11
 A UK MoD report claims: “Research and development on hypersonic technology is expanding, principally in the 
USA. The projected (USAF) priority plan is to produce unpiloted air-breathing aircraft with a Mach 8-12 capability 
and transatmospheric vehicles which can operate between the upper air-breathing and sub-orbital flight regimes, as 
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Current robotic collection systems such as the Global Hawk drones are only at the beginning of a 
wider technological revolution that could fundamentally transform human society and warfare in 
the 21st century. There are not many limitations in terms of size, allowing theoretically 
developing robots and sensors of a microscopic size. Robotic systems can also more easily 
combine a intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance function with an operations or combat 
function, as can be already seen in the Predator drone. A lot of R&D in the fields of robotics, AI, 
and NT is highly classified, in particular hypersonic and stealth drones, micro-drones and nano-
scale systems, but there is still enough material in the public domain for giving students some 
ideas about the future potentials of these technologies.  
 
Automated Processing, Analysis, and Surveillance Technology 
This topic is difficult to cover, but is nevertheless too important to simply exclude it from any 
overview course on TECHINT. Since technical collection enables the systematic collection of 
vast volumes of data, there has been a growing need for the automated processing and analysis of 
this data. There are also new types of surveillance and monitoring systems that are highly 
automated and that can flag suspicious individuals, communications, activities, and threats to 
analysts. Basic methods include traffic analysis, speech recognition, machine translation, data-
mining, and link-analysis. Some of the methods and tools are in the public domain. From 
unclassified documents related to Echelon it seems that the IC used voice recognition and 
machine translation since the 1970s.12 Various sources indicate that the NSA can monitor 1.5 
billion communications a day by relying on voice recognition, machine translation, word-
spotting, and context-spotting with the help of weekly updated dictionaries. It is very hard to 
understand capabilities in this field because of the very rapid technological development and the 
scarcity of information on automated signals and imagery processing within the IC.  
 
How to Teach about Secret Government Technology 
A course on technical intelligence cannot rely exclusively on official documentation since most 
of it is classified and not available for use in an academic program. It is therefore important to be 
creative in terms of finding relevant and trustable sources and in terms of presenting these 
materials to the students. In a field like intelligence deception is the normal mode of operation. 
As a result, there can be very few certainties in intelligence studies even with respect to the 
historical records of intelligence services since they not only conceal their current activities, but 
even try to manipulate their historical records in order to shape their public image and in order to 
permanently cover up controversial activities or particular cases of incompetence or corruption. 
While little is certain, it is absolutely crucial to communicate to the students where there is more 
or where there is less certainty and to indicate to them particular sources and the varying degrees 
of reliability of available information.  The main sources on an overview course on technical 
intelligence collection would mainly comprise of historical literature and relevant declassified 
documentation. Also important for such a course would be technical and scientific literature that 
discusses some of the engineering and scientific foundations of technical intelligence collection 
systems and analysis methods. In addition, there is unclassified literature that deals with certain 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
well as highly supersonic vehicles at Mach 4 to 6.” Meirion Jones, ‘Report Fuels Spy Plane Theories,’ BBC News 
(14 June 2006), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/5079044.stm. 
12
 ‘Echelon Automated Data Processing Equipment,’ ca. 1976-82, available at: http://cryptome.org/jya/echelon-
adpe.htm. 
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unclassified aspects of TECHINT, which outlines particular challenges for technical collection, 
or which provides particular visions or goals for future capabilities. Finally, it is crucial not to 
disregard leaked information and information that comes from whistleblowers or former insiders. 
Equally important is information from official foreign sources, such as parliamentary 
investigations and reports. An important example is the 1999 Europe Union (EU) report on 
Echelon.13  
 
Historical Cases 
It is always good to start with information that is best documented and therefore most reliable. 
Some historical focus gives the students a better understanding and appreciation of the 
technological evolution that laid the foundations for today’s capabilities. For example, there is a 
large amount of excellent literature on code breaking during the Second World War, in particular 
on the history of the allied achievements of breaking Enigma and Purple. Many technical aspects 
of both the Enigma machine are described in detail, as well as the methods and activities that 
contributed to breaking the Enigma cipher. Of course, code breaking has not really stopped with 
the Second World War, nor has it remained unchanged. In other words, going into the history of 
code breaking is beneficial for the students, but they also need to be aware of certain more recent 
breakthroughs in cryptology and more current approaches of collecting and processing signals. 
This sometimes requires venturing into more unconventional territory in terms of sources than 
the official histories of code breaking that stop with the years after the Second World, Venona 
being the last major declassified U.S. code breaking effort.   
 
Physics and Engineering Principles 
Many physical and engineering principles and physical limitations of collection systems are in 
the public domain and can be utilized for a TECHINT course. The intelligence studies literature 
includes some notable contributions that describe the engineering aspects of some current 
systems such as Synthetic Aperture Radar or methods such as spectral sensing, which are also 
used for a range of civilian research applications. An excellent primer in this respect is Robert 
Clark’s The Technical Collection of Intelligence where he outlines many current collection 
technologies and the underlying physical principles.14 There is a tremendous amount of literature 
on computer hacking, computer crime, and cyber espionage that does not necessarily deal with 
national security, but which is equally for this domain, as the main principles and issues are 
similar in the civilian world.  
 
New Technological Challenges, Visions, and Goals 
For getting a better feeling for what kind of capabilities are desired or might be available in the 
future it is always good to look at agency websites that publish vision and planning documents, 
including professional or in-house journals as far as they are accessible to the public. This type 
of literature provides a better understanding of what the agencies consider to be their main 
challenges and even how they intend to overcome these challenges. Although there is no 
classified information included in such publications, they do give insights about current 
capabilities as sometimes existing capabilities are described as aspirational, which allows people 
                                                             
13
 ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications 
(ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI)),’ European Parliament (22 July 2001).  
14
 Clark, Robert M., The Technical Collection of Intelligence (Washington: CQ Press, 2011). 
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with access to this classified information to openly write about them without giving away any 
secrets. Another good source of information on currently developed revolutionary technology is 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), as the agency publishes tenders for 
projects that it intends to fund, including some technological specifications for these projects. 
For example, DARPA has been funding brain mapping research for over a decade, which could 
ultimately lead to capability of brain reading that could give intelligence agencies direct access to 
the brains of our opponents.15 The thoughts and dreams of a subject could be decoded. As far out 
as this sounds, it is very likely that some limited capability in this regard already exists, 
considering progress made in public research.16    
 
Whistleblowers and Leaks 
Some of the most revealing and potentially most valuable information comes from current or 
former insiders, who leak information to the public as whistleblowers to expose wrongdoing or 
to affect a change in policy concerning certain activities or to make technologies that are kept 
secret available to the general public. Since it is usually impossible to understand the motivation 
of whistleblowers and leakers and since it is difficult to verify the information, one has to be very 
careful with respect to leaked information. At the same time, it is absurd to disregard information 
just because it has been leaked. For example, historians writing about the Vietnam War could not 
possibly ignore the leaked Pentagon Papers, no matter how they feel about Daniel Ellsberg and 
his intentions. The same applies to ‘WikiLeaker’ Bradley Manning and thousands of other 
former insiders, who decided to break their secrecy oath for whatever reason. As scholars, 
researchers, and educators we have to take leaked information seriously until it is proven to be 
inaccurate. One way of overcoming uncertainty is to rate sources to understand the value of the 
information coming from them. Anonymous leaks have to be distrusted more than leaks from an 
identified source, and an identified source with verifiable credentials is more trustworthy than a 
source without verifiable credentials. As everything in the intelligence world is so highly 
compartmentalized, even former insiders can only provide small pieces of the puzzle and they 
may themselves be manipulated into unwittingly planting disinformation. One should always try 
to corroborate information from leaks and whistleblowers with information from other sources. 
Obviously, the account of a single whistleblower or from a single leak has to be distrusted, but 
the accounts of many whistleblowers can cumulatively add up to a more coherent and more 
complete picture. 
 
Conclusion 
A course on TECHINT can be either very historical, focusing only on technologies and methods 
that were state of the art 50 or more years ago, or it could be very technical, focusing on the 
physics and engineering aspects of collection systems and methods of analysis that would 
provide only a very narrow understanding of TECHINT. For an overview course on current 
TECHINT capabilities and methods for students in non-technical academic programs I 
recommend to strike a healthy balance between the history and the science, while also 
incorporating information that is somewhat outside of the ‘regular’ intelligence studies literature 
and possibly at the fringes of the professional and academic literature. Some speculation on 
                                                             
15
 Moreno, Jonathan D., Mind Wars: Brain Research and National Defense (New York: Dana Press, 2006), 97-113. 
16
 Kathleen Taylor, “Mind Reading Is Possible!,” Salon (15 December 2012), available at: 
http://www.salon.com/2012/12/15/mind_reading_is_possible/. 
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certain capabilities should not only be considered permissible – to some extent it is simply 
unavoidable. Apart from the more theoretical and skill-oriented sub-field of intelligence analysis, 
most aspects of intelligence studies and intelligence history can never claim the same certainty 
with respects to facts than the natural sciences or even social science disciplines. One has to 
accept that concealment and deception about collection methods and capabilities is part of the 
game and that official documentation about current capabilities and operations might only be 
revealed in twenty-five years from now, if at all. It is just important to indicate to students where 
the information comes from and to what extent the information can be trusted.  
Covering the history and the science/ engineering aspects is quite straight-forward. When it 
comes to covering current and near future TECHINT capabilities, then I would recommend the 
following rules of thumb for arriving at a more accurate estimate of what might be 
technologically possible in today’s world.  
 
1. Current or future intelligence capabilities are more advanced than older and known 
systems for technical collection and analysis. This should be obvious. Everything that 
could be done some decades ago can be done today much better since technology has 
advanced and continues to advance. For example, biometrical face recognition systems 
for Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) that were first deployed in London’s Borough of 
Newbury in 2002 and which disappointed in their lacking ability of identifying any 
criminals known to be living in that area, have probably improved by a factor of a 
hundred times over the last decade. From this perspective a nationwide system utilizing 
biometrics for tracking people on watch lists is probably not that far away.17    
 
2. If a certain technology is available in the civilian world, the U.S. government can be 
expected to have a more advanced version. This is also a ‘no-brainer’. No private 
business can match the resources of the U.S. government for the R&D of national 
security relevant technology. Whatever gets deployed in the private sector in the security 
field is naturally inferior to what the government has. Looking at commercial 
technologies allows us to extrapolate from the known public sector technology to 
whatever technology the government may have available. If a private entrepreneur such 
as Richard Branson can build a space plane with some moderate investment than one can 
be fairly certain that the U.S. government already has the capability of a ‘Common Aero 
Vehicle’ that can reach any point on earth in just a few hours.    
 
3. If a certain technology is available to or used by foreign governments, the U.S. 
government will also have that capability. While other governments are hardly less 
secretive about their secret weapons and intelligence systems, there is sometimes more 
information available on foreign systems or capabilities than on U.S. systems and 
capabilities. This makes it worthwhile to look at what other nations have come up with. 
Surely, if other governments have it, the U.S. government will have a deluxe version. For 
example, the Russians and the Chinese have built submarine bases with undersea 
entrances. It is a reasonable assumption that the U.S. Navy also has secret submarine 
                                                             
17
 Michael Kelley, ‘The FBI’s Nationwide Facial Recognition System Ends Anonymity as We Know It,’ Business 
Insider (10 September 2012), available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-fbis-nationwide-facial-recognition-
system-2012-9. 
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bases, possibly undersea bases, which are used for highly classified intelligence 
operations.18  
 
4. If a certain technology or capability is currently presented as theoretical, chances are it 
already exists or may exist in the foreseeable future. There is a whole range of 
intelligence technologies that are described as aspirational like: ‘it would be good if we 
could look hundreds of feet underground in order to find deeply buried facilities.’ It is 
quite possible that High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) in 
Alaska can use ELF/VLF radio waves reflected from the ionosphere for detecting deeply 
buried facilities around the world.19 This is, of course, speculation, but there are many 
indicators pointing in the direction that HAARP has an operational function, be it 
communication with submerged submarines around the world or be it missile defense. 
Even if HAARP lacks the capability of looking underground, the use of ELF/VLF waves 
for this purpose, as well as other methods like the detection of electromagnetic 
anomalies, could be available for this end.       
 
From my limited experience teaching an overview course on TECHINT I can say that students 
tend to be fascinated by topics such as the extremely secretive development of revolutionary 
intelligence capabilities. It has become a huge part of what the IC does. For the instructor and 
students alike it is great fun to practice analytical skills, to dig up snippets of information here 
and there, and to ponder the possibilities. 
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